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President Urho Kekkonen
of Finland and the KGB
 KIMMO RENTOLA
A major post-Cold War history debate in Finland has been over the role 
of President  Urho Kekkonen and his relations with the Soviet Union, in 
particular with the Soviet foreign intelligence. No surprise to anybody, 
variance of interpretations has been wide, fuelled by scarcity of sources 
on the most sensitive aspects, by the unavoidable ambiguity of an issue 
like the intelligence, and even by political leanings.1 As things stand now, 
even a preliminary assessment of available evidence – viewed from a 
distance – might prove useful.
The Soviet Union regularly tried to build back-channel contacts and 
confi dential informal links with the Western powers. On the Soviet side, 
these contacts were usually conducted by intelligence offi cers, as were 
those to  Robert Kennedy on the eve of the Cuban missile crisis,2 and to 
Chancellor  Willy Brandt during his new German Ostpolitik.3 By far the 
1 A good introduction to Finnish studies on Kekkonen in J. Lavery. ‘All of the 
President’s Historians: The Debate over Urho Kekkonen’, Scandinavian Studies 
75 (2003: 3). See also his The History of Finland. Westport: Greenwood Press 
2006, and the analysis of D. Kirby, A Concise History of Finland. Cambridge 
University Press 2006.
2 An account by G. Bolshakov, ‘The Hot Line’, in New Times (Moscow), 1989, 
nos. 4-6; C. Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and 
American Presidency from Washington to Bush. London: HarperCollins 1995, 
278–80. The best known exception is the back channel to Kissinger, which was 
not conducted by an intelligence offi cer, but by Ambassador Dobrynin.
3 W. Keworkow, Der geheime Kanal. Berlin: Rowohlt 1995.
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longest relationship of this kind was established with Kekkonen, whose 
contacts were keenly cultivated by both sides from 1944 right up to his 
resignation in 1981.
On Kekkonen’s relationship with the KGB there is only a thin 
sample of Soviet documents, complemented by memoirs, the most 
informative of which are by the long-time Helsinki rezident  Viktor 
Vladimirov, published only in Finnish.4 The Finnish documentation is 
more extensive now after President Kekkonen’s diaries were published 
in four volumes.5 Kekkonen recorded his hundreds of conversations with 
KGB representatives; at fi rst shyly, calling his interlocutors a “Mr. X” or 
a “Mr. Zh.”, but then unblushingly by their real names. The diaries were 
not written for later publication, but for working purposes, to remember 
who said what and when. Thus the main defect of the entries is brevity, 
abridgment to barest essentials. During his numerous visits to the Soviet 
Union, Kekkonen did not produce any entries; he was not so stupid as to 
take a diary along.6
FINLAND AS A TARGET
According to a Soviet intelligence offi cer, Finland was a kind of great 
power as far as intelligence was concerned.7 Finland became a major 
intelligence target for the Soviets right after the Winter War (1939–
40), because  Stalin’s decision to attack Finland as well as the one to 
4 V. Vladimirov, Näin se oli… Helsinki: Otava 1993. Memoirs by other high KGB 
offi cers (A. Akulov, F. Karasev, E. Sinitsyn) are much more tight-lipped and their 
quality is lower. Only the posthumous (and confused) memoirs of Sinitsyn have 
also been published in Russian.
5 Urho Kekkosen päiväkirjat, ed. by J. Suomi, vols. 1-4. Helsinki: Otava 2001–
04. The diaries cover the period from 1958 to 1981. The Finnish security police 
archives are a fi rst-rate source for other politicians’ contacts with the KGB. 
However, the security police considered it prudent not to produce written reports 
on the President’s contacts, despite the fact that they were noticed.
6 On some short trips, there are entries, probably written after returning home.
7 This was said to the author by Albert Akulov, who was a prominent KGB 
political line offi cer in Helsinki. Of course, it is an exaggeration, but not totally 
baseless.
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make peace had been based on fatally faulty intelligence,8 and he was 
determined never again to repeat the catastrophe. By mid-1940, the 
number of Soviet intelligence offi cers in Finland was second only to that 
in the United States; even Germany hosted fewer.9 By May 1941, NKGB 
resident  Elisei Sinitsyn was able to procure fi rst-rate information from 
government sources, including the fact of the imminent German attack 
and the Finnish participation in it.10
As soon as peace was again in sight, the Soviets focused on high-level 
political contacts. In February 1944 in Stockholm, Soviet intelligence 
established contact with  Eero A. Wuori, the head of the Finnish trade 
unions, who described the basic anti-Nazi stance of Marshal Mannerheim 
to a charming female journalist, who happened to be working for Soviet 
intelligence.11 After the armistice in September 1944, this effort was 
revived in Helsinki by Sinitsyn, who again showed up, now as a political 
counsellor in the Soviet Control Commission. Among the fi rst to call was 
Urho Kekkonen, 44, a fast rising Agrarian politician.12 
8 K. Rentola, “Sovjetisk etteretning og Stalins beslutning om krig og fred 
med Finland, 1939-1940”, in Motstrøms: Olav Riste og norsk internasjonal 
historieskrivning, ed. by S. Holtsmark, H. Pharo & R. Tamnes. Oslo: Cappelen 
2003, 188–17. The article is based on NKVD foreign intelligence documents. 
For Stalin admitting the failure in the April 1940 post mortem session, see A. O. 
Chubaryan & H. Shukman (eds.), Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War 1939–1940. 
London: Cass 2002, 196.
9 Introduction by O. I. Nazhestkin in Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei razvedki, 
vol. 3 (1933–1941), ed. by E. M. Primakov et al. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye 
otnosheniya 1997, 17–8, quoting a report by the head of foreign intelligence P. 
M. Fitin. In the US, there were 18 offi cers, in Finland 17, in Germany 13.
10 NKGB reports from Helsinki, 4 Jun 1941; 10 Jun 1941; 13 Jun 1941, in Sekrety 
Gitlera na stole u Stalina: Razvedka i kontrrazvedka o podgotovke germanskoi 
aggressii protiv SSSR. Mart-ijun’ 1941 g. Dokumenty iz Tsentralnogo arkhiva 
FSB Rossii, ed. by V. K. Vinogradov et al. Moscow 1995, 140, 151–3, 157.
11 Venona decrypts, Razin to Fitin, Feb 1944. Wuori was mentioned as ‘Tsilindr’ 
in these telegrams. On the female agent ‘Klara’ (Gusti Stridsberg), see W. Agrell, 
Venona: Spåren från ett underrättelsekrig. Stockholm: Historiska Media 2003, 
302–28.
12 In 1943–44, Kekkonen developed a contact with the American intelligence in 
Stockholm (Vilho Tikander of OSS), but he does not seem to have had contacts 
with the Soviets (or the British) before the armistice.
Kimmo Rentola
272
Since Finland avoided occupation, instead of directly imposing 
their will, the Soviets had to fi nd ways of infl uencing those in power 
in Helsinki. As for the Finns, they remained in the Soviet sphere of 
interests, a fact acknowledged by the Western allies, and the leaders of 
the country had to adapt to this. As usual in rapidly changing situations, 
fi rst something is done, and the theory justifying the action would be 
formulated only afterwards. As for the Agrarian contacts with the Soviet 
intelligence,  Kaarlo Hillilä (Minister of the Interior, 1944 to 1945) wrote 
later that it was vital to prevent the strong Finnish Communist Party from 
having exclusive access to the Soviets. It was necessary to deal directly 
with the Soviets on as high a level as possible, so the Communists could 
not ‘fake out Russian support even when that did not exist at the moment, 
and so obtain positions otherwise out of reach for them.’13
 Stalin never believed what was said to him above the table; he wanted 
to know what the other side was really up to. The Finns adapted to this. 
Even old President  Paasikivi understood the necessity of confi dential 
contacts, but would not deal personally with intelligence offi cers, 
not wanting to touch ‘an ugly fi sh’, as he said.14 Instead, he relied 
on middlemen and messengers, various left wing social democratic 
politicians,15 and Kekkonen.
Kekkonen was qualifi ed for this. In the 1920s, he had served as an 
offi cer in the Finnish security police, and then prepared his doctor of law 
dissertation on agent provocateur, a police agent inside revolutionary 
ranks. On his study trips to Vienna and to Berlin he discovered that the 
learned doctors in the security police of these countries ‘did not even 
know as much as I know’, as he complained to his wife.16 He saw 
Moscow for the fi rst time as a counter intelligence offi cer, checking out 
13 National Archives of Finland (KA), Paasikivi papers V: 35, Memorandum by 
Kaarlo Hillilä, 31 Oct. 1950, attached in Kekkonen to Paasikivi, 11 Dec 1950.
14 Paasikivi’s diary, 15 Jun. 1946, J.K. Paasikiven päiväkirjat 1945–1956, vols. 
1-2, ed. by Y. Blomstedt & M. Klinge. Helsinki: WSOY 1985–86.
15 The most important ones were Mauno Pekkala (prime minister, 1946–48), 
Reinhold Svento (2nd Foreign Minister) and Eero A. Wuori (chairman of the trade 
unions, then minister, in 1945 ambassador to London). In Sinitsyn’s memoirs, 
they are mentioned under code names, and can be identifi ed on the basis of 
Paasikivi’s diary entries on their discussions with the Soviets.
16 Kekkonen to his wife Sylvi, 25 Jun. 1928. Kekkonen dropped this theme and 
wrote his dissertation on local elections law.
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listening devices and security lapses in the Finnish mission. Although 
his second visit in 1945 was in a friendship delegation, even then the 
attendant Soviet lady watcher suspected that the Finnish Minister of 
Justice, Mr. Kekkonen, was a spy. He was so curious, always asking 
pertinent questions and very sensitive ones at that; at the kolkhoz he 
wanted to know which of the men had fought on the Finnish front and 
how many had fallen, and then he wanted to see the house of the poorest 
kolkhoznik. On top of it all, he was capable of assessing the exact amount 
of spectators in a football match in Moscow.17 
Despite his background, Kekkonen did not immediately grasp every 
peculiarity of his new friends, as can be seen from the letter in which he 
described to his wife how  Sinitsyn in June 1945 transferred him to his 
successor,  V. F. Razin. 
Elisei is leaving for good; last Friday the Finnish-Soviet Friendship 
Society threw a farewell dinner for him. There, he asked me to 
dinner on Sunday. I believed a good many people would attend, 
but there were only him, the newly arrived Razin, and me. When 
the restaurant ran short of brandy, we came to our home, where I 
invited [ Kustaa Vilkuna], and he brought along [a female artist] 
and we had a cozy night. Razin speaks good German. I think that 
through Razin I can take care of my business.18
This was a routine transfer meeting of a Soviet intelligence contact, a 
pattern Kekkonen did not fully understand at that time. But the full nature 
of these new contacts was not easy to grasp for Razin either. A seasoned 
intelligence offi cer, he tried to run agents according to offi cial rules, and 
(if we can believe Sinitsyn’s memoirs) at his fi rst meeting with Kustaa 
Vilkuna, he thrust him a brown envelope stuffed with money. Sinitsyn 
had to go to great pains to explain the ‘misuderstanding’ to an offended 
Vilkuna, who was an academic scholar and a personal intelligence hand 
for Kekkonen. And when Kekkonen put out serious political feelers as if 
joking, as he always did with the Russians (‘l’ll probably take over the 
17 Russian Foreign Policy Archives (AVP RF), fond  012, opis 6, papka 85, 
delo 273, ll. 11-13v, Report by T.Yu. Solovieva, offi cial of the Soviet society for 
cultural contacts (VOKS), 12 Oct. 1945. Kekkonen was a sports union leader, so 
the number of spectators was routine for him.
18 Kekkonen to his wife Sylvi, 19 Jun. 1945.
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Ministry of Interior in the next government’),  Razin was not at all on the 
same wave length, but responded according to the offi cial line only: ‘The 
man there should enjoy the trust of the working class’ etc.19
During Razin’s tenure, 1945 to 1947, Moscow hoped that Finland 
would also follow the path to a people’s democracy. Accordingly, their 
intelligence activities concentrated on the communist control of the 
security police (Valpo). When it turned out that Finland had a path of 
its own, the signifi cance of confi dential contacts with non-communist 
politicians rose again, and a pure national force like Kekkonen’s party, 
the Agrarians, was much less suspected by the Soviets than the social 
democrats, who were connected to an international movement.
THE NATURE OF THE BACK CHANNEL
Some characteristics of this relationship became evident early on. 
First, the backdoor channel was useful in vital issues, as the Mutual 
Assistance Treaty of 1948. Before and during the negotiations, Kekkonen 
was in touch with  Mikhail Kotov and others, explaining the utter limit the 
Finns could accept, and painting in dark colours the threat of anti-Soviet 
forces coming into power in Helsinki if these reasonable needs would 
not be met by the Soviets. This and the information obtained from other 
sources (in particular, the Finnish generals’ opinion that in a possible 
world war Finland would need to take the Soviet side20) made it possible 
for Stalin to accept a lesser treaty than the Hungarian and Rumanian ones 
he fi rst set as models. From the Finnish point of view, the most important 
feature of the channel was where it led to: right to the top in the Kremlin, 
and with reasonable speed. This function was underlined by the fact that 
19 Paasikivi’s diary, 14 Feb. 1947.
20 The information on generals’ opinions was delivered by the Minister of 
Interior Yrjö Leino (a communist) or by Finland’s ambassador to Moscow, Cay 
Sundström. Kekkonen was careful not to divulge military secrets. In 1954, when 
the KGB needed to know what the Finns would do in case of a Soviet attack on 
northern Norway in a major war, Kekkonen did not say anything himself, but his 
close female friend said to the KGB that Finland would not put up any resistance 
in such case. AVP RF, fond 0135, opis 38 (papka 204), d. 6, pp. 177–8, Memo 
of a conversation between Anne-Marie Snellman and Yu. V. Bakey, on 6 and 7 
May 1954.
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discussions between state leaders were usually interpreted by the KGB 
Helsinki resident and not by professional interpreters.
The 1948 pattern was to repeat itself in every major treaty concerning 
the position of Finland. In particular, when Finland negotiated its Western 
economic integration treaties, fi rst with the EFTA and later with the EEC, 
the Soviet ‘yes’ was obtained through patient background discussions 
with the KGB representatives. In issues like these, the KGB tended 
to ignore other Soviet interests not vital from their particular point of 
view, so that an ambassador complained in his memoirs how the foreign 
ministry often prepared complicated negotiation strategies only to fi nd 
out that the Finns had already agreed the main issue secretly through the 
KGB, thereby getting benefi ts they would never have been able to pull 
from diplomatic or foreign trade bureaucracies.21
Second, the back channel tended to reduce communist infl uence in 
Finnish political life. The Communist Party, with a fi fth of the popular 
vote, was a formidable force, and one of Kekkonen’s main preoccupations 
in his dealings with the Soviets was to use the contact to domesticate 
the communists.22 In 1954, for instance, the Soviets compelled Finnish 
communists to drop their resistance to military appropriations in the 
Finnish budget.23
Third, it is not simple to establish, which side dominated. The Soviet 
Union was a superpower, Finland a small neighbour, and the KGB 
offi cers were trained to see their contacts as agents and as objects or 
instruments in their operations. But there was more to it than that. In 
1944, Kekkonen and  Vilkuna were in their mid-40s, 10 to 15 years older 
than  Sinitsyn and  Kotov, and with experience in counter-intelligence, 
government, and academic life. Finland was their home turf and the 
contact language was Finnish. According to Sinitsyn’s memoirs, his 
meetings with Vilkuna always commenced with alternating Kalevala 
verses: the folklore professor tortured a Smolensk country boy. Every 
21 J. Derjabin, Omalla nimellä. Helsinki: Otava 1997.
22 This was noted and complained by the Foreign Ministry in Moscow: 
‘Kekkonen often uses his contacts with Soviet representatives for various 
political manoeuvres.’ AVP RF, f. 0135, op. 38 (papka 204), d. 8, pp. 16-27, ‘K 
obstanovke v Finlyandii’, 24 Jun. 1954, a memo prepared by A. Aleksandrov and 
I. Marchuk, signed by section chief G. F. Pushkin.
23 Details in K. Rentola, Niin kylmää että polttaa: Kommunistit, Kekkonen ja 
Kreml 1947–1958. Helsinki: Otava 1997.
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issue at hand always received full attention from the Finns, who knew all 
details, but the Soviet leaders in Moscow could devote only a fraction of 
their attention to Finland, and they mainly wanted to hear that everything 
was proceeding as it should. In case of confl icts, the KGB in Helsinki 
sometimes had incentives to smooth out chukhna peculiarities24, because 
in case of escalation, they would have to answer to embarrassing questions 
about their earlier reports. Of course, there were limits to this. With time 
passing and experience accumulating, the roles were reversed, not with 
Kekkonen so much as with the next generation, such as when  Kotov in 
the 1970s dealt with ambitious politicians thirty years his junior, like 
 Paavo Väyrynen.
Finally, the perennial question: what is in it for me? In addition to 
high-level issues, the KGB always tried to collect small commissions, 
their pounds of fl esh, loose change, as it was described by Kissinger. 
Even from  Khomeini in 1979, the Moscow headquarters wanted 
something specifi c, a gesture.25 An introduction, a juicy piece of news, 
prevention of something to be published (or leak of another item), and 
most desired of all, a person wanted by Soviet security.26 In April 1950, 
when Kekkonen was appointed prime minister for the fi rst time, his 
government decided to hand over two Estonian anti-Soviet guerrillas, 
who eight months earlier had succeeded in escaping to Finland. One was 
actually delivered.27 Probably with this in mind, the following summer 
Kekkonen told the Agrarian party congress: ‘I am affected neither by 
24 ‘Chukhna’ is a pejorative Russian word for a Finn, in particular in the St. 
Petersburg area. Mikoyan had a fi ne collection of chukhna jokes he said he fi rst 
heard from Sergei Kirov.
25 V. Kuzichkin, Inside the KGB: Myth and Reality. London: André Deutsch 
1990, 271.
26 ‘Whatever is given to the KGB must be done secretly, deeply, and with 
very strong precautions’, explained ‘General Marov’ to writer Norman Mailer;
see his Oswald’s Tale: An American Mystery. New York: Random House 1995, 
405.
27 This man, Artur Löoke, was condemned to death in Tallinn, as can be seen 
in the Estonian KGB archives. The other one, Herman Treial, was too sick to 
transfer; an unsuccessful escape attempt made him an international celebrity 
and drew e.g. Eleanor Roosevelt’s appeal, but soon after he died in a Helsinki 
hospital. The documents in the case fi le (12 L Treial & Löoke) in the Foreign 
Ministry Archives and personal fi le no. 11461 in the Security Police Archives.
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hate nor by love, when what is at stake is political action for the best of 
the country.’28 In February 1956, fi ve days before the electoral council 
was to vote on the next President of the Republic, the Kekkonen camp 
and the KGB busy making deals, an illegal Soviet intelligence offi cer 
who had sat in a Finnish prison almost two years was suddenly pardoned 
and ejected over the eastern border.29 Of course, there is no conclusive 
proof of a connection between this pardon and the presidential deals.
Kekkonen’s special slice was career promotion. The main prize 
was reaped in the 1956 presidential elections. To stop any anti-Soviet 
candidate, the Soviets fi rst wanted President  J. K. Paasikivi to continue, 
despite his advanced age (85 years); this was the offi cial Soviet line as 
late as fi ve days before the crucial electors’ meeting.30 Then, however, 
Kekkonen and  Vilkuna sold their KGB contacts ( Kotov and  Vladimirov) 
the idea that Kekkonen could also obtain a majority if the communists 
were given detailed orders on how to use their votes and if some additional 
measures were taken.  Khrushchev, who liked risky ventures, gave his nod 
on a dramatic day, when he delivered his secret speech to the 20th CPSU 
Congress. So, the Soviets abandoned Paasikivi, the communists were 
given orders (the party leaders needed to be shown the actual Moscow 
cipher telegram to turn their heads), and Kekkonen was elected by the 
closest margin possible.31 Had it failed, the two KGB offi cers would 
28 That remained his credo: ‘I do not feel any feelings in this offi ce.’ Kekkonen’s 
diary 19 Dec 1963.
29 His name was K. A. F. Holmström, by birth a Swede; he had been watching 
northern Norwegian defence facilities. The pardon was signed by the Police 
Superintendent (an Agrarian close to Kekkonen) during a leave of the social 
democratic Minister of Interior. The decision came as a surprise to the security 
police, who were planning to let the man slip into Sweden. Documents in his 
personal fi le no. 11524, Archives of the Security Police of Finland.
30 A memorandum for the Moscow top leadership on the presidential elections 
in Finland, 10 Feb. 1956, by Ivan Tugarinov, deputy chief, KI pri MID, AVP 
RF, f. 0135, op. 40, papka 215, d. 34, ll. 6-13.  The ‘small KI’, a rump from 
the intelligence conglomerate KI, remained in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
as an analytical centre. See V. Zubok, ‘Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: 
The “Small” Committee of Information, 1952–53’, Diplomatic History, vol. 19 
(1995: 3).
31 A synthesis by T. Polvinen in his J.K. Paasikivi: Valtiomiehen elämäntyö 5, 
1948–1956. Helsinki: WSOY 2003.
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have found themselves far away, but as winners they were fast on their 
way towards the rank of general. In 1957, at 41,  Kotov was promoted to 
deputy chief of foreign intelligence in charge of western Europe.32
PRESIDENT AND REZIDENT
A contradictory situation developed after 1956. On one hand, Kekkonen 
was a pro-Soviet politician with close contacts to the KGB, and these 
were continued. In 1958, he recorded eleven private discussions with 
the KGB rezident, and in addition there were phone calls, meetings with 
others present, and the rezident’s private meetings with Kekkonen’s 
closest allies. On the other hand, he was now the head of a state which 
had agencies that practised counter intelligence operations against the 
very same KGB. Tracking a high KGB offi cer, Finnish security police 
offi cials sometimes saw that the Finn the chekist was going to meet was 
the President of the Republic himself.33
The KGB tried to fi nd ways to use this to their advantage. Immediately 
after the 1956 elections,  Vilkuna travelled to Moscow to meet a senior 
Soviet foreign intelligence offi cial. ‘The guy’ wanted something in return 
for KGB support: the Finnish Ministry of Interior should be taken over 
by the Agrarian party, ‘to secure the security police and its surroundings 
keep appropriately to the right line instead of the present bias. Otherwise 
not possible to sleep in peace. [This is] no interference in Finnish internal 
affairs, but the actions of the other side [the West] must also be under 
decent control.’34 
‘The guy’ asked for a lot. Kekkonen was able to deliver only after 
the further shock of the ‘Night frost’ crisis of 1958.35 After that, the 
32 Reports signed by him in the appendix in Ocherki istorii rossiiskoi vneshnei raz-
vedki, vol. 5, 1945–1965. Moskva: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya 2003, 690–97.
33 To avoid attention, Kekkonen sometimes met the KGB resident in the house 
of his son or elsewhere.
34 Kekkonen Archives, 1/25, Vilkuna to Kekkonen, 25 Feb. 1956. ’The guy’ 
was higher than the KGB men in Finland, possibly A. M. Sakharovski, who was 
responsible for Scandinavia and was promoted foreign intelligence chief in May 
1956. 
35 Preparing for that crisis, the KGB (Vladimirov) made a harsh attack against 
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Ministry of the Interior was headed by Agrarians for eight years36, and 
the security police controlled by the president. But this did not mean 
cessation of Finnish counter-intelligence activities. The change consisted 
of the fact that from that point on, everything was done quietly, in the 
dark. Emphasis was put on preventive action; espionage cases37 were 
usually not brought to court, double agents were no longer used to trap or 
provoke the KGB,38 no KGB diplomat was declared persona non grata. 
Many were quietly asked to leave, sometimes by the president himself, 
when he was seeing his good friend, the local KGB chief. When the 
president met the resident, between smiles and assertions of trust, crude 
raw truths were said, as if joking, and somewhere in the shadows their 
subordinates quietly clashed, and both knew that this was the case. The 
most famous non grata case was that of a high-level political line offi cer, 
 Albert Akulov, who was asked to leave in 1973, when he not only tried 
to recruit Finns, but also spied on the Japanese embassy. Reportedly, 
Kekkonen said that this man would not be seen in Finland as long as he 
was the President of the Republic. The Soviets took this literally.
Kekkonen knew which agency his Soviet friends served; he wanted 
the guys sitting as close to the Devil’s right hand as possible. But he was 
kept in the dark about the full extent of the activities of his friends. He did 
not ask, not liking being lied to.39 His best contact  Mikhail Kotov, who 
the Finnish security police, wanting Kekkonen take action to set a limit to their 
activities. Kekkonen Archives, Karjalainen fi le, Ahti Karjalainen to Kekkonen, 
13 Jun. and 24 Jun. 1958.
36 In 1966, when the Agrarians fi nally had to give the Ministry of Interior to the 
Social Democrats, police issues were transferred to the minister of defence, who 
was an Agrarian.
37 In some trials since 1953, even Russian intelligence offi cers caught on illegal 
reconnaissance missions in Finland had been condemned to prison.
38 In 1958, the Finnish security police was, after four years of action, preparing to 
reap the benefi ts of a complicated double agent operation, which was planned to 
lead into expulsions of fi rst-rate KGB diplomats (e.g. Zhenikhov and Vladimirov). 
The plan was quietly dropped. Supo Archives, personal fi le no. 11572; the fi le on 
Soviet espionage, no. XXIII E 1 – 26.
39 Immediately after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, Kekkonen was most 
upset and offended by the fact that the Soviets had blatantly lied to an old 
customer like himself right to his face. Kekkonen’s diary, 22 and 23 Aug. 1968.
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used to show up in Helsinki to explain some unexcepted turns of events,40 
was not available after the occupation of Czechoslovakia. He was busy in 
Prague as the chief KGB foreign intelligence representative there. Back 
in Helsinki in 1971, he did not mention this komandirovka to Kekkonen. 
Nor did  V. M. Vladimirov say, showing up again in 1970, where had he 
been meanwhile. This British style gentleman had been the head of the 
KGB department responsible for sabotage, assassinations and the like. 
Probably he told Kekkonen as much as he wrote in his memoirs: in the 
meantime, he had been involved in ‘some issues in Soviet-Chinese and 
Soviet-Czechoslovak relations.’
Most of the prominent Helsinki KGB hands worked almost their 
whole career in Finnish affairs. Many were involved with Finland for 
more than thirty years. The language effectively chained an offi cer to 
Helsinki. Foreign intelligence insiders believed that members of their 
‘Finnish mafi a’ looked like Finns, dressed like Finns, behaved like Finns. 
They were reticent, phlegmatic, and slow, liked the sauna, skiing, hard 
drinking and even weather ‘almost as their own.’41 On some occasions it 
is plausible that KGB offi cers could see where the situation would lead to 
sooner and better than their superiors in the Kremlin. When Finland’s free 
trade agreement with the EEC was negotiated,  Kotov said to Kekkonen 
that he ‘disagrees with the Soviet leadership’ and thinks that the offi cial 
(strictly negative) Soviet line was faulty. He said he believed that in the 
end Moscow would allow the Finns to sign up with Brussels.42 
WESTERN ATTITUDES
Western intelligence knew about the close relations between Kekkonen 
and the KGB. The most critical moment came after 15 December 1961, 
when KGB major  Anatoli Golitsyn (in Finland Klimov) defected from 
Helsinki to the CIA. The Soviets told Kekkonen that Golitsyn was ‘a very 
40 E.g. the defection of Golitsyn, the assassination of Kennedy, the dismissal of 
Khrushchev, the foreign political turn of the SDP right wing leader Leskinen.
41 As described by Gordievsky in O. Gordievsky and I. Rogatchi, Sokea peili: 
Ihmisiä vallan ja vakoilun puristuksessa. Helsinki: WSOY 1997, 166.
42 Kekkonen’s diary, 3 Jan. 1973.
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low-level offi cial and knew almost nothing’,43 having served in Helsinki 
only for a short period and against the main enemy, not in Finnish affairs. 
But it turned out that he had picked up more than gossip about KGB 
political operations. He told the Americans about the prevalence of the 
political fi eld in the Helsinki KGB operations, and gave several names 
and code names for Soviet ‘agents of infl uence’ in Finnish political life, 
and even a list of restaurants used for meetings.44
Americans discussed the revelations with Kekkonen himself. The 
president ‘received the information calmly, and with keen interest, and 
did not contest it’. He ‘also mentioned that some people, because of the 
positions held by them, were required to be in regular contacts with the 
Soviets and might give an impression they were being used.’ Thanking 
the Americans for the information, the president said that he would now 
be able to warn the next prime minister to be careful when appointing 
new Cabinet ministers.45
Despite this last rather comical remark and his outward calm, 
Kekkonen was nervous. As a cautionary measure, for two years he did 
not meet directly with the new KGB resident,  Yuri Voronin.46 It seems, 
43 Kekkonen’s diary, 13 Jul. 1963. The information had been given at some point 
earlier, but Kekkonen recalled it here in connection with the West German Felfe 
case.
44 According to the list received by Finnish military intelligence, Eero A. Wuori 
was ‘Moses’, the splinter social democratic leader Aarre Simonen was ‘Sika’ 
(Swine), but Kustaa Vilkuna was under a neutral name ‘Ville’. P. Salminen, 
Puolueettomuuden nimeen. Helsinki: Suomen mies 1995, 146, 189. In the Supo 
Archives, fi le amp XV U 1 b, there is a list of 28 KGB and GRU offi cers, written 
down by and by the Finnish security police chief Armas Alhava, no title, no 
signature, no date, but late 1962.
45 A memo from the US Government to the Swedish Prime Minister Tage 
Erlander, given on 20 Jan 1962, published as an appendix in J. Widén, Notkrisen 
och dess efterspel: USA:s relationer med Sverige under en av kalla krigets 
höjdpunkter, oktober 1961-mars 1962. Stockholm: Forskningsprogrammet 
Sverige under kalla kriget 2004.
46 In Kekkonen’s diaries, no private meetings with Voronin are recorded, except 
one, on 5 Apr. 1964. Of course, there could have been meetings not recorded 
by him, but this seems improbable, because he eagerly recorded (and directed) 
meetings with Voronin by others close to him, as Ahti Karjalainen or Arvo Korsi-
mo (19 Jan. 1963, 19 Mar. 1963, 8 Nov. 1963 and several others). During this 
period, Kotov frequently visited Helsinki to consult Kekkonen in case of important 
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however, that the main Western conclusion drawn from  Golitsyn’s 
revelations was that the West must take a more positive and constructive 
attitude to Kekkonen to avoid pushing him completely to the Soviet side. 
The Swedish Prime Minister  Tage Erlander was urged by the US to pay 
more attention (in a positive sense) to Kekkonen. This he did.
In August 1963,  Rex Bosley of the British intelligence showed up 
in Helsinki to talk with Kekkonen about the revelations. He said that on 
Golitsyn’s list of top Finns ‘in Soviet service’ were the two leaders of 
the splinter social democratic party ( Emil Skog and  Aarre Simonen), the 
commander of the Helsinki City Police ( Erik Gabrielsson), and last but 
not least, Urho Kekkonen himself. ‘Was there really “in Soviet service”? 
Kekkonen asked. ‘That’s what he said’, Bosley responded, but then 
explained that the West considered the president as a mysterious political 
fi gure, close to  Khrushchev, but not ‘in service’. Kekkonen was relieved. 
In his diary he pondered the proper way to get it known in Moscow 
that he was considered mysterious, ‘even suspected’ by the West. This 
information ‘would strengthen my position in the Soviet Union.’47 
Here, Kekkonen reaped the fruit of sharing of his assessments of 
Soviet leaders with Western intelligence circles. His most important 
Western contact was Reginald ‘Rex’ Bosley, whom he for an unknown 
reason called ‘Art Dealer’ (Taulukauppias).48 Bosley, who had served in 
Finland in the 1940s, showed up in 1957 to say that there was a group 
in the British government willing to keep up unoffi cial contacts with 
the Finnish president.49 By the mid-60s, Bosley had visited Kekkonen 
developments. Voronin’s predecessor V. V. Zhenikhov, whom Kekkonen met 
frequently, lost his job because of the defection of his subordinate.
47 Kekkonen’s diary, 29 Aug. 1963. Bosley also told about the case of Penkovsky, 
‘the biggest spy that can be imagined’. Due to him, the West saw that the Soviet 
Union is not as strong as it was trying to make others believe. The damage he did 
to the Soviets was irreparable. Years later, Bosley said that Golitsyn had claimed 
that Kekkonen was ‘a spy hired by them’, but the SIS had rejected the accusation 
‘by saying that UKK [Kekkonen] is their spy.’ Kekkonen’s diary, 5 Nov. 1975.
48 Information about the nickname given to the author by Gen. Urpo Levo, 
who was the president’s aide-de-camp and organized many of his clandestine 
meetings.
49 J. Suomi, Kriisien aika: Urho Kekkonen 1956–1962. Helsinki: Otava 1992, 
108.
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more than 20 times.50 In the US archives there is a memo on a frank and 
detailed discussion between Kekkonen and ‘a British friend’ at the height 
of the Note Crisis in 1961.51
If we can infer from topics discussed, the Swedish industrialist  Marcus 
Wallenberg might have served as Kekkonen’s intelligence channel to 
some circles in the West.52
THE  BREZHNEV PERIOD
Three weeks after  Khrushchev’s fall, the new Soviet leadership restored 
the direct KGB contact with Kekkonen. The new resident in Helsinki, 
 V. S. Stepanov, was of Karelian (or Finnish) origin and had a perfect 
command of language. Immediately on arrival he wanted to meet in the 
presidential sauna, to declare that he, unlike the ambassador, had direct 
contact with Brezhnev. ‘Has he?’ Kekkonen pondered, and had his close 
ally ask  Albert Akulov of the KGB political line if this was really the 
case. Envious of his new boss, Akulov declared that it was he who had the 
direct link to Brezhnev and not Stepanov, ‘at least not yet’.53 This incident 
shows a new feature: the Soviets, including KGB offi cers, slandered 
each other and even criticized their top leaders. Early on, after the Cuban 
missile crisis,  Kotov had said that ‘some people in the USSR, he among 
them, had considered Khrushchev’s policy towards the US too soft. But 
the decision had to be made quickly and the other line would probably 
have led to the occupation of Cuba [by the US].’54 When Brezhnev came 
50 Kekkonen’s diary, 9 Jul. 1965. On this visit, Bosley said that Shelepin would 
take over the Soviet leadership.
51 National Archives (US), Record Group 84, Box 7, folder 320, Finland-USSR 
1959–1961, Memo on a discussion between Kekkonen and a friend on 6 Nov. 
1961, 8 Nov. 1961, published by J. Aunesluoma in Finnish in Historiallinen 
Aikakauskirja, vol. 100 (2002: 2). Nothing has so far turned up in the British 
archives.
52 When the KGB Helsinki rezident gave Kekkonen a rather extensive account 
of Soviet leaders’ thinking on the war in Vietnam, the next day Kekko nen told 
Wallenberg about it. Kekkonen’s diary, 27 and 28 Mar. 1965.
53 Kekkonen’s diary, 7 and 10 Nov. 1964.
54 Kekkonen’s diary, 9 Jan. 1963.
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to power, the KGB channel produced a frank assessment about the new 
leader: ‘That’s a stupid guy.’55 Kekkonen probably agreed.56
Through the new rezident, Kekkonen fi rst tried to promote ideas 
developed during the  Khrushchev era, such as the exchange of Finnish 
recognition of the German Democratic Republic for the return of the 
city of Vyborg (in Finnish, Viipuri) with surroundings, lost in the Second 
World War.57 Initially, the KGB man was eager, but the new ideological 
climate in Moscow did not turn out to be favourable. After the occupation 
of Czechoslovakia, Kekkonen dropped the idea.
KGB efforts to infl uence Finnish political life were facilitated by the 
fact that, hoping for entrance into the government, traditional anti-Soviet 
parties were changing their line and beginning to strive for Soviet contacts, 
the Social Democrats from the mid-60s and then also the Conservatives. 
Kekkonen thus lost the argument that if the Russians did not deal with 
him, worse forces would take over in Finland. On the other hand, Soviet 
positions were weakened by electoral losses suffered by the traditional 
customer parties, the Agrarians and the Communists, and by currents 
inside these two parties which favoured distancing themselves from the 
Soviets. On the surface, all relevant forces took their oaths of loyalty 
to friendship and the ‘ Paasikivi-Kekkonen line’, but deeper and hidden 
forces were fi ercely competing with each other, and on both sides. 
Around 1970, the Soviets were even afraid of ‘losing’ Finland. A silent 
crisis developed, when the CPSU International Department – backed by 
 Suslov and, to an extent,  Brezhnev – were trying to introduce a more 
distinct left-wing domination in Finnish political life after Kekkonen, who 
was believed to be retiring. Deputy head of the international department, 
55 Kekkonen’s diary, 17 Oct. 1964. Which one of the Soviets said this is not 
written down. The entry was written on the basis of the discussions Kekkonen’s 
close ally Korsimo had in Moscow with the former Helsinki resident Zhenikhov 
about the reasons for Khrushchev’s dismissal.
56 When British Prime Minister Harold Wilson suggested that Brezhnev would
do as a secretary general for the Transport Workers’ Union, whereas Kosygin 
could be an excellent chairman for the Imperial Chemical Industries, Kekkonen 
agreed, but did not offer further criticism of Brezhnev. Instead, he gave his 
thoughts on how this kind of a man had been able to come to power. The National 
Archives (UK), Foreign and Commonwealth Offi ce (FCO) 33/724, Record of 
conversation between Wilson and Kekkonen, 17 Jul. 1969.
57 Kekkonen’s diary 19 Oct. and 16 Nov. 1965.
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 Aleksei Belyakov, was appointed ambassador to promote these ideas. The 
KGB, however, wanted to continue business as usual with Kekkonen and 
after him with his more docile pupil,  Ahti Karjalainen.58 Kekkonen and 
the KGB prevailed, the ambassador was pulled out after seven months 
in offi ce.
During this crisis Kekkonen showed an additional feature in his 
dealings. Aware of the fact that the KGB would not trust his word only, 
Kekkonen wrote memorandums about what the president was believed 
to be thinking, and these were then given to the KGB by his personal 
intelligence chief, Professor  Kustaa Vilkuna, who was a long-time regular 
agent in the KGB books.59 So, the KGB obtained both the president’s direct 
views and secret agent information about these, both of which had been 
carefully prepared by Kekkonen himself. In the agent reports, the Soviets 
were sometimes criticized rather sharply for their insuffi cient support 
for the president in his diffi cult task. The president was described to be 
very depressed because of the Soviets having let him down, ‘completely 
alone (…) without the slightest help from any of yours.’60 The brightest 
KGB chiefs in Helsinki possibly guessed that also this agent information 
originated from Kekkonen, but they could not afford to destroy a pattern 
certainly appreciated by the Centre. Of course, the KGB probably had 
also real (but weaker) agent sources around Kekkonen.
KGB purists accused the Helsinki political line of becoming a branch 
of diplomacy. Where were actual agents, meeting in secret, taking orders, 
doing as they were told to and getting paid for it?61 The Helsinki hands 
responded by infl ating numbers and by recording contacts as agents,62 and 
58 A detailed description and assessment of this crisis in K. Rentola, Vallan-
kumouksen aave: Vasemmisto, Kekkonen ja Beljakov 1970. Helsinki: Otava 
2005, part of which published as ’Der Vorschlag einer europäischen Konfe renz 
für Sicherheit und die stille Krise zwischen Finnland und der Sowjetunion’, in 
Neutralität – Chance oder Chimäre? Konzepte des dritten Weges für Deutsch-
land und die Welt 1945–1990, Hrsg. D. Geppert u. U. Wengst. München: Institut 
für Zeitgeschichte 2005, 177–202
59 This kind of ploy is mentioned in Kekkonen’s diary on 7 Dec. 1970.
60 Kekkonen Archives, Yearbook for 1971, P.M. on 1 Apr. 1971, no signature, 
Kekkonen’s note: ‘Vilkuna to Vladimirov’.
61 O. Kalugin, Proshchai, Lubyanka! Moskva: Olimp 1995, 225.
62 According to Gordievsky (1997, 124–6) the KGB political line in Helsinki 
in the 1970s had 33 actual agents, 33 confi dential contacts, and 25 targets under 
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by trying to prove that operative conditions in Finland were extremely 
complicated and very diffi cult.63 Operatives with experience of big 
powers ridiculed this: how come a tiny security police with a hundred 
offi cers could create diffi cult conditions? But the Helsinki hands did not 
bow down. On the contrary,  V. M. Vladimirov proved ‘scientifi cally’ 
in his dissertation in the KGB Academy that in specifi c (and diffi cult) 
operative conditions it was necessary to shift emphasis from traditional 
agent operations to modern contact network, through which all necessary 
information could be obtained.64
By the 1970s, the  Brezhnev stagnation began to take its toll on KGB 
operations in Finland. Discipline was slackening, there were instances 
of corruption and various side efforts. In 1973, the former KGB resident 
to Helsinki,  V. S. Stepanov, asked Kekkonen to propose to Brezhnev 
and  Podgornyi that he, Stepanov, be appointed as Soviet ambassador 
to Helsinki.65 After some hesitation, Kekkonen agreed, fearing that the 
arrogant Karelian might get his appointment even without his support. 
Kekkonen might have been tempted to play various Soviet interests and 
bureaucracies against each other in order to gain more latitude; he was 
aware of intense rivalry between Soviet actors, but that was a dangerous 
game and uncertainties were huge. In any case, Stepanov was appointed, 
but forced to resign from the KGB.66 In Helsinki, his arrival made a 
mess of the KGB high level network and in particular of relations with 
Kekkonen. As ambassador and ‘Vice President of Finland’, as he liked to 
present himself, Stepanov was in charge of offi cial relations, but he also 
development. The total fi gure corresponds with the records of the Finnish security 
police, where the KGB political line offi cers in Helsinki in 1970 had 101 recorded 
contacts persons who were met more or less regularly. However, it seems absurd 
that 33 of these could have been agents in any meaningful sense.
63 Estonian State Archives (ERAF) library, KGB collection, Memo by Capt. 
A.P. Akulov, ‘Agenturno-operativnoe obstanovki v Finlyandii: Obshchii obzor’ 
(KGB copy, secret, no. 55), 1968.
64 Kalugin (1995, 225) says that Vladimirov’s conclusion was strongly sup ported 
by Kryuchkov, new head of foreign intelligence from 1971.
65 V. Stepanov to Kekkonen, dated 20.9. but should be 20.11.1973, published in 
Kirjeitä myllärille 1956–1981, ed. by P. Lähteenkorva & J. Pekkarinen. Helsin ki: 
Otava 2000, 369. 
66 Kalugin, Proshchai, Lubyanka!, 224. The English translation does not include 
passages on Kekkonen.
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wanted to control his old area of confi dential contacts, despite the fact 
that the KGB was represented by a very senior offi cer,  Mikhail Kotov. 
‘Kotov mildly criticized  Stepanov’, Kekkonen noted.67 The two Soviets 
‘seem to be on bad terms. K. of course is jealous of S.’68
After Kotov, the Helsinki residency was taken over for two years by a 
son-in-law to somebody high up, a completely incapable know-nothing, 
not even able to speak Finnish, Swedish or German, the three languages 
Kekkonen knew. The president did not even get his name right. ‘Kotov’s 
successor’, he noted in his diaries.
CONCLUSIONS
Some preliminary conclusions can be drawn.
First, the information currents. By 1970, there could not be any 
signifi cant political secrets in Finland for the Soviets. Discussing the 
fate of the presidency and the successor problem with Kotov, Kekkonen 
noted that the KGB resident ‘knew everything, even things I did not 
know.’69 In political terms, Finland was transparent to the Soviets and 
their network enabled them to infl uence matters heavily. Kekkonen for 
his part received every kind of Moscow rumour and unique information 
on Soviet leaders, their way of thinking, even hidden motives,70 and their 
pecking order, although even he was often surprised and disappointed by 
their actions.
Second, it is possible that Soviet intelligence operations in other areas, 
such as traditional military intelligence, were a bit neglected in Finland. 
67 Kekkonen’s diary, 15 Jul. 1975.
68 Kekkonen’s diary, 25 Nov. 1975.
69 Kekkonen’s diary, 23 Oct. 1972. Earlier, Kotov had a more traditional boast 
that ’we know better than you, what the people of Finland are thinking and talking 
about in railway carriages, restaurants, offi cers’ clubs….’ Kekkonen’s diary, 25 
Nov. 1963.
70 On the Soviet leaders’ concerns inside the Socialist camp, Stepanov said 
that the situation in Poland was becoming better and Gomulka’s position was 
strengthening, whereas in Czechoslovakia the new leadership was losing control. 
‘In both countries, the Zionists are guilty.’ Kekkonen’s diary, 6 Apr. 1968.
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Not that there was much to hide, but this was quite a diffi cult terrain to 
penetrate into, as were some other ‘hard’ branches of the Finnish state.
Third, for political reasons and to boost their network, the KGB 
regularly helped Kekkonen and Finnish industries to get huge profi table 
deals, which they in purely economic terms would probably not have got. 
What was even more important, through his contacts Kekkonen was able 
to obtain Soviet approval for Finnish participation in Western economic 
integration. Thus, KGB contacts strengthened capitalism in Finland.
CODA
Kekkonen was as skillful an operator as anybody connected with the KGB, 
but his last days in offi ce were unavoidably melancholic. In June 1981, 
 Brezhnev informed the CPSU politburo that because of his worsening 
health, Kekkonen is thinking of withdrawing from offi ce rather soon. (In 
fact, he had two months to go.) As for the successor, he no longer repeated 
his earlier negative views of his former protégé  Ahti Karjalainen, but 
the latter had meanwhile acquired a notorious reputation, drinking too 
much and getting involved in scandalous situations. Kekkonen had said 
to the KGB resident – now again a competent offi cer,  V. M. Vladimirov 
– that his most suitable successor would be  Jaakko Pajula, director of the 
National Pension Fund.
This was an ‘utterly unexpected turn’ for the KGB. Pajula was not 
generally known, and lacked a strong political base. The KGB was 
astray, in this decisive moment they could not offer any advice at all 
to the Kremlin, nor were they able to assess how the situation would 
develop in the nearest future.71
Kekkonen did not record anything of this in his diary; possibly he 
did not remember the details afterwards. It is diffi cult to believe that 
such a renowned tactician could produce such a silly and unrealistic idea. 
As loyal supporters of Kekkonen, Pajula and his friend  Olavi J. Mattila 
(whose name was mentioned in an earlier KGB-inspired successor 
plan) had been promoted to high positions in state-controlled parts of 
economic life, but they did not carry any political weight of their own. 
71 Russian State Archives for Contemporary History (RGANI), f. 89, per. 42, d. 
44, str. 5, Zasedaniya politburo TsK KPSS, Rabochaya zapis’, 18 Jun 1981.
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In the last instance, both Kekkonen himself and the KGB lost control of 
the most important lever of Finnish-Soviet relations, that of the Finnish 
presidency. The limits of the KGB infl uence were shown by the fact that 
Kekkonen’s successor, social democrat  Mauno Koivisto, was elected 
without clear Soviet support, even against their wishes.72
72 Koivisto preserved the KGB contact inherited from Kekkonen and took care 
of many vital issues through that channel. Only at the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, he informed the last KGB resident Feliks Karasev that this system was 
now over and henceforth issues between the states would proceed through regular 
diplomatic channels.
